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By Alison Kelly
Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland
Address to Atlanta Consultation III
Atlanta, January 22, 2010
I would like to thank the Carter Center, the Middle Powers Initiative, the sponsors and all those who have contributed to the organisation of this conference for the excellent arrangements and hospitality. These discussions and the valuable Briefing Papers come at a key moment as we begin this crucial year for the NPT and it is a great honour and a personal pleasure to be here.
In looking broadly towards the NPT Review Conference in May and strategies for success, the critical factor will ultimately be its contribution to restoring the authority of the NPT and confidence that it can continue to serve as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the 21 st century. 2010 will be judged in the short term on whether it agrees real progress across the spectrum of issues of importance to NPT States Parties, incorporating practical and concrete measures. In the longer-term, it will be judged by whether commitments undertaken since 1995 are implemented and processes set in train prove irreversible.
The 2005 Review Conference failed because of inability to progress on nuclear disarmament and the Middle East resolution, while the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences were judged successes, which they were of course in terms of agreed outcome. At the same time, many of the commitments have not been implemented and the status of outcome documents has been called into question. A starting point in 2010 should therefore be a clear r e-statement of purpose and a reaffirmation of undertakings of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. I hope that the political space has opened up sufficiently for this to be achieved and that the rhetoric of high-level statements by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States will translate into such clear and categoric commitment and create a solid basis for new undertakings. As well as a serious review of implementation, we must agree a balanced, consensual and forward-looking package of decisions on all three pillars and on the Middle East resolution. In addition, we need to build into the system an improved method of measuring progress and accountability in relation to commitments undertaken. The NPT was designed in a different era and many of the challenges facing it have evolved over time. We no longer live in a Cold War environment. Our world is globalised, interdependent, and increasingly fragile and this 21 st century reality must inform our negotiations in 2010.
Success in May will require balanced movement on all tracks. While a nuclear-weapons-free world cannot be achieved without a strong non-proliferation regime, neither can progress be delayed by the ongoing creation of new conditions for its achievement. I agree very much with what Sergio Duarte said yesterday on this point. Real deliverables on all pillars and the Middle East resolution are a sine qua non for success in 2010.
Let me now briefly give our view on what would constitute substantive progress on significant issues. Nothing will be new to you and all points came up yesterday. A key priority is nuclear disarmament and I would like to welcome the political will expressed by a number of the nuclear-weapon States to work towards a nuclear-weapons-free world and the concrete progress being achieved in the START replacement negotiations. However the main issues have unfortunately changed little in the last decade because of the limited level of achievement. These remain universality; nuclear doctrines; reductions in nuclear forces; security assurances; nuclear-weapon-free zones; negotiation of a treaty on fissile material; and testing of nuclear weapons. We need to significantly strengthen transparency and accountability. On non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy, we should establish the political commitment and framework to strengthen the IAEA’s capacity to fulfil its verification responsibilities and plug gaps and to bolster its technical assistance capabilities. We need to step up progress on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel supply issue. On the Middle East, o nly by inserting reality and practicality into the debate and working for incremental progress can we start to move forward. We need to look at what institutional and practical measures are feasible, what these might encompass and in what time-frame. And as I indicated earlier, progress for us will also involve provisions to strengthen implementation across the NPT regime. The review mechanism developed in 1995 and 2000 has not stood the test of time and a number of more successful models have evolved in other areas. There is definite scope for improvement to the institutional body of the NPT through the incorporation of elements from other treaties. These could include enforcing safeguards, enforcing disarmament deadlines, creating a standing secretariat; and improving reporting and transparency.
The atmosphere at the Review Conference will be important in establishing the basis for constructive negotiations on a consensual package of decisions. We need to build common purpose, good faith and a positive climate in whatever way we can. From a poor start in 2007, the atmosphere has improved through the review cycle and I would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Chidyausiku for his significant contribution last May. That Preparatory Committee offered a useful preview of areas of common ground and contention and potential agreement and disagreement and clearly identified the issues on which meeting of minds is required. All of us need to work tirelessly to build bridges in the months ahead, particularly with the nuclear-weapon States and with the NAM. Review Conferences are about negotiation, and negotiation requires outreach and engagement.
Let me set out some areas where I believe that a real difference could be made in the period ahead through outreach. We should clarify and promote the importance of compliance and verification across all pillars. Iran and the DPRK present, in different ways, a very real challenge for the non-proliferation regime, and for the Review Conference. Both have exploited the weakness of the NPT to pursue illicit nuclear programmes. It is not enough for us just to propose stronger ways of dealing with non-compliance, although that is necessary. We should better explain how Iran in fact damages the interests of NAM countries and that Iran is not an excuse for limits on access by other States to nuclear technology, a view which rightly or wrongly has been adopted by many NAM members. We need to work to convince the NAM that we are living up to the NPT deal in respect of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Beyond stating that the things we seek – such as the Additional Protocol and export controls - do not affect inalienable rights under Article IV of the NPT, we should demonstrate willingness to assist others by undertaking initiatives such as joint research and the sharing of expertise. We should bolster the role of the IAEA on all fronts, ensuring the necessary political support, legal authority and budget (with the management reforms necessary to assure its proper use) for the Director-General and for the Secretariat. Equally we could better promote export controls - both their very existence, and the fact that they need to be strengthened. We should also live up to our own ideals – as we advocate the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply, we should ensure that policy is practised. We should sell other nuclear frameworks such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety and invest more effort in highlighting nuclear security issues and benefits and assisting States in meeting their responsibilities.
We need to continue to press home to the nuclear-weapon States that they are obligated to comply with their commitments on nuclear disarmament. Speeches are very welcome but actions speak louder than words and they must live up to their responsibilities. On the Middle East resolution, we cannot allow the apparently insurmountable obstacles to lead to deadlock in May. We need to establish whatever common ground and positions are possible and then work on practical steps. I would also encourage the three depositaries of the NPT, who co-sponsored the 1995 resolution, to engage more actively on the issue.
Regional and cross-regional groups can make important contributions in political and in practical terms. Ireland is a member of three such groups – the EU, the New Agenda Coalition and the Vienna Group of Ten. All have presented working papers to the PrepComs and all are working actively for the RevCon.
At the highest level, the engagement of the UN Secretary-General in setting out and promoting his Five-Point Proposal has been very influential. The role of civil society is critical and listening to the presentations and interventions over the past two days has been inspiring. The Middle Powers Initiative and the Global Security Institute have worked tirelessly to educate and to advocate a nuclear-weapons-free world. The op-eds in the US and several European countries by former senior politicians have returned the issue of nuclear disarmament to the political limelight. Those of you focused on a nuclear weapons convention have highlighted that cause. The work of ICNND and of Global Zero is genuinely adding momentum.
In conclusion, circumstances are in many respects more propitious for the NPT than for a decade. There are however very significant challenges ahead and progress is by no means assured. Success will not happen without robust leadership and all of us must play our part. We need to see rhetoric translated into practical steps. Bridges must be built and divergent positions understood and narrowed.
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