Speech by Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr.
Chatham House
November 5, 2004
In 1958, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made clear the reason the United Kingdom acquired nuclear weapons. Referring to the British nuclear weapon program, Macmillan said in a television interview that "the independent contribution [i.e., British nuclear weapons] . . . puts us where we ought to be, in the position of a great power." Likewise, in a November 1961 speech, French President Charles de Gaulle said that "a great state" that does not have nuclear weapons when others do "does not command its own destiny." And after the May, 1998 Indian nuclear tests, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced with pride. "We have a big bomb now, India is a nuclear weapon state." Although, it is an historical accident, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) are the five nuclear-weapon states sanctioned by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)-the central instrument of international security in today's world. It would appear that the belief held by many of the 182 NPT non-nuclear weapon states that some nuclear weapon states cling to nuclear weapons as their political claim to great power status is not without foundation.
It is important to keep in mind in considering these issues that the NPT is based on a central bargain: the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The NPT was not designed to establish "nuclear apartheid," to use the words of a former Indian Foreign Minster, permanently authorizing great power status and nuclear weapons to a small group of states and assigning the rest of the world to permanent second class status. Maintaining both ends of this central bargain is vitally important to the long-term viability of the NPT.
There is an additional element to this basic structure of the NPT regime-not stated in the treaty-which is the assurance of the many NPT non-nuclear-weapon states that their regional neighbors will not acquire nuclear weapons. This concern, held by some of the negotiating parties, was one of the principal reasons that the NPT was not given permanent status when it was negotiated. Rather a decision as to its eventual duration was put off for 25 years, until the treaty's 1995 Review and Extension Conference when states-parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely.
A most important underpinning of this element of the NPT basic structure has been the nuclear "umbrella" provided by the United States for its allies in Europe (most importantly Germany) and Asia (Japan and South Korea). This policy permitted U.S. allies to enjoy the protection of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War without having to incur the expense of building nuclear arsenals and without creating a nuclear weapons infrastructure that would be politically difficult to dismantle. Giving up nuclear weapons (or any other means of strength and security) is not a natural action for states, but it is far easier to forswear them than to eliminate them once an arsenal is in place. In one way or another over the years, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine, Libya, and Australia have contemplated acquiring these weapons. South Africa actually secretly built several nuclear bombs, but then voluntarily dismantled them.
The U.S. policy of extended deterrence-the nuclear umbrella-has been an important factor in this relative success to date of nonproliferation efforts. But, the primary reason for this success has been the negotiation, entry into force, permanent extension in 1995 and continued vitality of the NPT and the associated treaty regime of many supplementary agreements. In the early 1960's, there were predictions that there could be as many as 25-30 nuclear-weapon states, with nuclear weapons integrated into their arsenals, by the end of the 1970's. President John F. Kennedy truly feared that nuclear weapons would sweep all over the world. If this had happened, there would be a large number of nuclear weapon states in the world today: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said in September that "40 countries or more now have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons" If many of these countries had chosen to exploit this capability, every conflict would run the risk of going nuclear and it would be impossible to keep nuclear weapons out of the hand of terrorist organizations, they would be so widespread.
Fortunately, they did not so choose. In 1960, after the first French nuclear weapon test, there were banner newspaper headlines "Vive La France." Yet by the time of the first Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, the test was done by stealth, India received worldwide condemnation and New Delhi hastened to explain that this had been a "peaceful" test. What had intervened was the NPT. It converted the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state from an act of national pride in 1960 to an act contrary to international law in 1974. There has been very little actual nuclear weapon proliferation since the entry into force of the NPT in 1970, far from what President Kennedy had feared. Beyond the five NPT nuclear weapon states, Israel and India were already far along in their programs in 1970. The only additional states truly to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons since that time are Pakistan and probably North Korea. Central to this situation is the international norm against nuclear weapon proliferation established by the NPT.
However, in the view of many of the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states the nuclear-weapon states have not lived up to their disarmament commitments. Most importantly, the nuclear "have nots" point to the failure by the nuclear "haves" (most significantly the United States) to put a permanent ban on nuclear weapon testing in place-the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally opened for signature in 1996 but it is unlikely to come into force in the foreseeable future-and the political value of nuclear weapons remains as high as it was over 40 years ago when MacMillian and DeGaulle made their comments. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 explicitly contemplated the use of nuclear weapons not only against Russia and China, but also against Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Libya, at the time all NPT non-nuclear weapon states. If the possession of a nuclear arsenal is to remain of high political value to the NPT nuclear weapon states, the United States in particular, and nuclear weapons continue to be given a central role in security policy as exemplified by the NPR, over time it may not be possible to continue to persuade additional states not to acquire these weapons. With the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT in 2003 and its likely acquisition of at least several nuclear weapons; the increasingly suspect Iranian nuclear program; and the disclosure of an illegal secret network of nuclear technology supply headed by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the "father" of the Pakistani program, many are saying that the NPT is broken and must be fixed or maybe is irrelevant. Heightening these concerns about the NPT is the threat of international terrorism and the possibility that terrorists may somehow come into possession of a nuclear weapon and actually use it against a large city somewhere. The NPT regime appears fragile and many fear for its long-term viability.
To further illustrate these points, let us examine the recent history of the NPT in a bit more detail, beginning with the 1995 Review and Extension Conference at which the NPT was made permanent.
Great skepticism was expressed by non-nuclear weapon NPT parties in 1995 about NPT nuclear weapon state compliance with the arms control part of the NPT central bargain when they came to the conference. However, a way was found to overcome this skepticism and make the NPT permanent. The price was the updated Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) and the Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (Statement of Principles). The NSAs were national statements associated with a unanimous UN Security Council Resolution made by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. These states declared that in effect they would not attack NPT non-nuclear weapon parties with nuclear weapons- a most reasonable commitment in that the then 173, now 182 NPT non-nuclear weapon states were being asked to make their forswearance of nuclear weapons permanent (China did not join in this declaration since it has always maintained a no first use of nuclear weapons policy). The Statement of Principles was a list of disarmament commitments made by the NPT nuclear weapon states, in addition to the NSAs, to achieve permanent status for the NPT. The chief commitments in the Statement of Principles, by the United States and all other NPT parties, included: a CTBT by 1996; universality of membership in the NPT including India and Pakistan but most importantly Israel; immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off-Treaty (FMCT); systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapon globally; additional nuclear weapon free zones; progress towards legally binding NSAs (the 1995 NSAs were national policy statements); strengthened IAEA safeguards, and expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
Between 1995 and 2000, only minimal progress was made in realizing these objectives which were political conditions to the legally binding indefinite extension of the NPT. The CTBT was completed and signed in 1996, but it was rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1999 and entry into force remains far off. New nuclear weapon free zones were established in Africa and Southeast Asia, but the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty has not yet come into force nor has the U.S. ratified any of its protocols. Alone among nuclear weapon states, the U.S. has not ratified any of the protocols of the pre-existing South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. An Additional Protocol strengthening NPT safeguards was signed in 1997 but as of 2004, less than 30 percent of NPT parties had ratified it. Thus, by 2000 (and to date) progress in implementing the Statement of Principles has been minimal.
Under the NPT, Review Conferences to review the operation of the Treaty-very much focused on the NPT central bargain-are required to be held every five years. Understandably then, there was even greater skepticism by the non-nuclear weapon NPT parties-led on these issues by the new agenda Coalition (Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa, Egypt, Brazil, and Mexico) - as they came to the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
But, for a second time, the non-nuclear weapon states supported a strong, permanent NPT regime in exchange for a further iteration of commitments by the NPT nuclear weapon states.
But, there was a difference this time in that three of the five NPT nuclear weapon states had ratified the CTBT (United Kingdom, France, and Russia) and China was clearly waiting for the U.S. The new Agenda Coalition negotiated directly with the nuclear weapon states. The result was the Thirteen Steps in which among other things the following was agreed: early entry into force of the CTBT and a continued test moratorium pending entry into force; negotiations on a FMCT to be completed by the 2005 Review Conference; the creation at the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body to negotiate nuclear disarmament; the early entry into force of START II, a START III Treaty as soon as possible, and a strengthening of the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; further reductions of nuclear weapons and increased transparency with respect to nuclear weapon programs; a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies; additional excess fissile material placed under IAEA safeguards; and a recognition of the "unequivocal undertaking" by the nuclear weapon states to the elimination of nuclear weapons.
There has been no progress toward any of the objectives contained in the Thirteen Steps. Having been around the track twice now, if not satisfied the NPT non-nuclear weapon states may begin to move away from the NPT after the next NPT Review Conference to be held in May, 2005. For example, countries such as Mexico and Egypt could consider such a step for symbolic reasons, while others such as Japan, South Korea, and Brazil might decide to reexamine the role of the NPT in their security policies. Although, NPT non-nuclear weapon states have been patient recently, it may well be that absent important steps forward with respect to the NPT disarmament obligations at the 2005 Conference, a crisis over continued NPT viability will become increasingly likely.
Recognition of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism has been long in coming. It was without doubt emerging by the late 1990s as the NPT regime became progressively weaker because of events such as the U.S. Senate rejection of the CTBT, nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the failure to proceed rapidly to secure the vast storehouse of nuclear explosive material in Russia left over after the Cold War, cheating on the NPT from within by so-called rogue states such as North Korea and Iran and the intensification of international terrorism most notably marked by the rise of Al Qaeda. Today, it is generally accepted that nuclear terrorism is the principal threat facing the civilized world today, even if the United States is currently and for the foreseeable future spending ten times as much as on ballistic missile defense as on efforts to secure the nuclear material stockpile in Russia-a dagger pointed at the heart of the civilized world.
However, ballistic missile defense offers no solution to the nuclear threat from rogue states as they, as would terrorists, would attempt to deploy nuclear weapons by stealth, rather than consider delivering them by ballistic missiles, which require years of testing and give so much notice that a plan to use them almost certainly would result in a preemptive attack by the United States. But, nevertheless, in terms of an effective threat rogue states in some ways should be considered as great a concern as are terrorist organizations. While a sophisticated terrorist organization could undoubtedly construct one or two crude nuclear weapon if it had the nuclear explosive material, it would be much easier for a state to do this. On the other hand, a state is governed by a regime, which has a built-in incentive to survive, and is much more easily identified and located than a shadowy terrorist group. To put it another way, states are deterable by the threat of nuclear or massive conventional retaliation. Terrorist organizations, which have no return address, are probably not deterable. Thus, while it might be considerably more difficult for a terrorist organization to acquire a nuclear weapon, it likely would believe itself much freer to actually use such a weapon. Rogue states most likely would seek nuclear weapons as insurance against attack against themselves not as weapons to actually use, unless attacked. It no doubt is notable that the two members of the "axis of evil" club that may possess or are working toward nuclear weapons have not been attacked while the one-member that had been rendered nuclear free by the international community was attacked.
As the number of states that possess nuclear weapons grows- and certainly possible additions would include so-called rogue states-because the nuclear weapons thereby become more numerous and more widespread, it will become progressively more difficult to keep such weapons out of the hands of terrorist organizations. The national leadership of North Korea and Iran are very unlikely to decide to commit national suicide, thus offensive use of nuclear weapons by them would simply be too risky. But working together with international terrorism as both these states are capable of doing is another matter. Providing nuclear weapons, either by sale or transfer for potential use is without question something to worry about. And, North Korea has a long history of selling its dangerous technologies to whoever will buy them.
It has been said that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive material in the hands of North Korea literally puts every city on the planet at risk. And, the same is true of Pakistan, where if a Taliban-type government were ever to take power there- not a remote possibility-transfer of weapons to Al Qaeda might well be take place. Likewise, a nuclear Iran might give weapons to Hezbollah. Of course, if a nuclear weapon that was used by a terrorist organization should be traced to a rogue state it would be subject to retaliation. So any such action would not be taken lightly by a state such as North Korea or Iran. Thus ultimately nuclear terrorism likely is the greater threat because a terrorist organization in possession of a nuclear weapon would use it and not be deterable. Rogue states, on the other hand, can be deterred from using and probably from transferring a nuclear weapon. But, the threat from so-called rogue states cannot be ignored as there will always be a risk that for its own reasons such a state might decide to take the chance to sell or give in secret a nuclear weapon to a terrorist organization.
And, if done with plausible deniability, retaliation for such a transfer might be politically difficult, particularly if the rogue state in question threatened the use of its own nuclear arsenal against its potential attackers or its neighbors. So, the world community must be alert to the potential the combination of the two, rogue state and terrorist organization working together to carry out nuclear terrorism.
But, it is the NPT regime that is our principal defense against a potential nuclear threat from both rogue states and international terrorist organizations. And, it is the NPT regime that has been weakened by neglect and failure to observe its provisions. And it is the NPT regime that will take center stage again at the 2005 Review Conference. The NPT could begin to seriously come apart after that conference if there is a continuing failure by the NPT nuclear weapon states to observe their side of the NPT central bargain. Non-nuclear weapon states may begin to behave like the nuclear weapon states by redefining transparency and consider nuclear programs contrary to their obligations. And, if the NPT ever fails, it could never be resuscitated. North Korea and Iran, as well as Pakistan, simply must be turned around. But, this is difficult to do (and it is difficult to restrict the nuclear fuel cycle, which is essential in solving these problems) unless the nuclear weapon states take seriously the central bargain of the NPT. And, this means first and foremost the entry into force of the CTBT. To quote Mohamed El Baredi, the Director General of the IAEA again. "We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction and acceptable for others to rely upon them for security . . . If the world does not change course, we risk self destruction."
But, if good policies can be developed for the 2005 NPT Review Conference and a recommitment by all is made to truly implementing the NPT central bargain, this would permit an effective hard line against potential NPT violators and , the NPT can become stronger. It can become the security instrument it was designed to be and the twin threats of rogue state acquisition of nuclear weapons and possession of nuclear weapons by international terrorist organizations, can and will be overcome.
This speech is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the speaker and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the speech. |
