The Program of Action on Nuclear Disarmament adopted by consensus at the Sixth Review Conference of the NPT contains thirteen practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article 6 of the Treaty. Ambassador Wulf and Victor already referred to some of the thirteen steps. If you would like to have more precise information on those thirteen steps I invite you to get a postcard published by NGOs supporting nuclear disarmament. This postcard contains the thirteen steps. The steps are a combination of proposals presented by the New Agenda, proposals presented by the five nuclear weapon states, and proposals presented by other delegations. As I mentioned, this is a compromise. The original proposals were more ambitious in some cases. In the end we managed to agree on these thirteen steps. Of course, the next review conference to be held in 2005 will review the implementation of the thirteen steps agreed last year.

Mexico believes that the commitments made at the 2000 conference could be fulfilled through, inter alia, the following concrete actions. All these actions are related to the thirteen practical steps.

First of all, the second conference on ways and means to facilitate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will be held in New York next September, from 25-27 September, and chaired by Mexico, probably by the Foreign Affairs Minister. This Conference should provide a framework for the early entry into force of this treaty.

Second, the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of ad hoc committees on nuclear disarmament and fissile material. So far it has not been possible to establish these two committees, as well as other committees because there is no agreement on the program of work in the CD. The main reason there is no agreement is because of the political positions taken by the United States, China and the Russian Federation regarding the preservation of the ABM treaty and the possibility of developing a national missile defense. This is what has obstructed an agreement in the CD. And the CD is the only negotiating body for disarmament. The CTBT was negotiated by the CD and once this review of US policy is completed we hope intensive consultations among the key governments could help the CD to start its work.

Another concrete action should be the continuation of the START process through additional bilateral reductions of nuclear weapons to be agreed by the US and the Russian Federation.

A fourth action could be unilateral and bilateral initiatives by the five nuclear weapon states in accordance with the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. So far there have been bilateral agreements reached between the US and the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom is an example of the unilateral reduction of some of its nuclear weapons. Of course at the same time they have modernized the existing ones. The position of the New Agenda Group is that France, the United Kingdom and China should join the US and the Russian Federation in the process of global nuclear disarmament.

A fifth action could be the observance of the principle of the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament measures. Ambassador Wulf has already mentioned this. And finally, the conclusion of arrangements by all nuclear weapon states to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA verification to ensure that fissile material will not be used again for the production of nuclear weapons.

After the 2000 NPT Conference the New Agenda group presented a resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly last October. That resolution was adopted by 153 votes in favor, 3 votes against, mainly the three states that are not parties to the NPT (India, Pakistan and Israel) and 8 abstentions. The resolution reflected to a great extent the substantive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, mainly the 13 steps contained in the Program of Action. The broad support for the resolution underlined the need for action to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons with the participation of all member states.

I would like to mention that the New Agenda Group presented a resolution for the first time in 1998. It was also adopted by a large majority, but with a good number of abstentions and votes against, and the same happened in 1999. But in 2000, after the successful outcome of the NPT Conference, the resolution only got 3 votes against, and 8 abstentions. Right now the New Agenda Group is in the process of consulting because this year we will again present a resolution for the consideration of the General Assembly. We hope that the broad support expressed last year will be continued again this year. Thank you.

JONATHAN GRANOFF: Thank you very much. I believe the NGO that produced the post card with the 13 steps is WILPF, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and their web site is www.reachingcriticalwill.org. The postcard would be available through them. I would now like to open the floor for some questions and comments. Do any of the panelists have any comments?

AMBASSADOR WULF: I would just like to pick up on a comment that Angelica made that there is more to the Final Document than just the 13 steps. And it is important to underscore that, because there is a tendency to focus on Article 6, and ignore the rest of the NPT. I think it is clear to all that nuclear disarmament cannot succeed if nuclear non-proliferation fails. It is very important that the totality of the NPT continues to be observed. This means that nuclear weapon states, such as the United States and Russia, have a continuing obligation to provide assistance to non-nuclear states through Article 4, not necessarily in terms of providing nuclear power plants. There are certainly many peaceful uses of the atom that have absolutely nothing to do with nuclear power. They have to do with nuclear medicine, hydrology, agriculture, etc. Those provisions also have to be observed. And a basic point: when a country, such as Iraq, or North Korea, who are parties to the NPT, violate that treaty, we also have to take those violations seriously. The closer we get to universality, and we are now within four countries of having every country in the world as a party to this treaty, the more important compliance becomes, because a treaty that is not observed obviously is not a treaty that will last over time.

CHARLIE PETERSON, Philadelphia Friends Meeting: I have a question for Ambassador Wulf, and perhaps others. You spoke about the possibility of other nations that may want to have nuclear weapons. What is the kind of enforcement action that is possible?

AMBASSADOR WULF: Enforcement is obviously one of the key issues. In the case of North Korea what happened was the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) detected something was wrong, and asked to do further inspections to clarify what the problem was. North Korea refused to allow it and the IAEA Board of Governors then referred the issue to the Security Council. The Security Council urged North Korea to comply, and all states to work with North Korea to see if there could not be a resolution. That in turn led to the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea.

In the case of Iraq, the violation only became known once the inspectors went into Iraq following the Gulf War. While there had been evidence to suggest that Iraq might be cheating on its NPT obligations even before the Gulf War, there was no proof. When the inspectors went in following the Gulf War, the proof was clearly there and the Security Council, in Resolution 707, found Iraq to be in violation and urged them to comply. But since there was already an enforcement mechanism in place with respect to Iraq, based on the overarching resolution after the Gulf War, that was viewed as adequate to address that malfeasance by Iraq.

There are no other cases in which a country has been found to have violated the NPT, although there are clearly countries whose activity, for instance their purchases, seem inconsistent with the peaceful program. The US works actively with other supplier countries to ensure that no one supplies equipment to those countries if that would lead them to have a nuclear weapons capability. But there is no short easy answer. The NPT, unlike the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) does not have enforcement mechanisms written into it. Clearly what was contemplated, and certainly what has taken place, is that the enforcement has been taken via the UN Security Council.

ED AGUILAR, Philadelphia LAWS and Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities: I want to follow up on what Ambassador Wulf mentioned the Korean Agreed Framework. For several years there have been negotiations between the two Koreas and the United States and I believe China has been helpful at various times. Pursuant to the Framework agreement, there seems to have been quite a bit of progress made last year, but this year these negotiations have been stopped with no current plan to resume. Could you comment on that, and on what can be done to pursue the Agreed Framework?

AMBASSADOR WULF: As far as the Bush Administration is concerned, we are back to the refrain, I am reviewing the situation. But Secretary Powell has made clear that the United States will observe the Agreed Framework and we will try to take actions to further the objectives of the agreed framework. How that will take place is still being examined. We will be meeting with South Korea and Japan. This is a three way effort joined in by other countries as well. The European Union makes a significant contribution, Australia and several other countries as well. But the three big players, in terms of money and politics, are South Korea, Japan and the US.

I do not know how it is going to unfold. Certainly there were some promises made by the North Korean government to the previous Administration in the area of missile transfers. There is concern whether all those provisions are being met, and verification of that. With respect to the Agreed Framework itself, the IAEA is maintaining a continuous presence at the North Korean nuclear facility. The construction of the light water reactors, a portion of the Agreed Framework, has gone very slowly indeed. Rounding up the money, arranging the financing and working through all the political problems has taken a lot longer than either side expected. So it is behind schedule, but it is going forward. My own personal expectation, but obviously I cannot speak for the Administration, is that we will continue to implement the agreed framework with the normal ups and downs that we experienced during the Clinton Administration. I expect we will continue to have those during the Bush Administration as well.

WILFRED GREY, UNA-UK: What factors most influenced the thinking behind the "unequivocal elimination of nuclear weapons?" The increasing number of generals who are saying that strategically and tactically the use of nuclear weapons is absurd? The World Court ruling? The fear that the NPT would unravel if they did not make the commitment? Revulsion against the use of nuclear weapons?

AMBASSADOR WULF: You ask a good question. I am not sure I have a good answer for you. I cannot get into the heads of the decision-makers who made the decision. I worked very closely with the Pentagon prior to the NPT to get the authority for us to engage in the negotiation as we did. None of the factors that you mentioned were the key factor. I would think the key factor is and remains the international security environment. Let me underscore that by reading a quotation from Colin Powell at his confirmation hearing. He was asked a question about Senator Cranston's views with respect to nuclear disarmament.

Secretary Powell said "his dedication to a world without nuclear weapons was known to all of us. And even though we disagreed on how to get there and what the world required right now, we both had the same goal in mind, and that was at some point in the future we should see a world where there were no nuclear weapons, there was no need for any, there was no need for missile defense, there was no need for strategic offensive forces, that mankind had moved beyond that. I hope that day is reached in our lifetime, but until then I also think that we have to remain strong and guard our interests."

I cite that quote particularly because of the last sentence, because I think that summarizes at least how Colin Powell looks at the issue, and I would daresay how the Pentagon looks at the issues. The strategic environment has to allow for reductions in the weapons to the point that you suggest.

Clearly if one takes the premise, and I think that premise is probably supportable, that the United States has superiority in conventional weaponry, one would think a world without nuclear weapons would be a world in which the United States would remain in a key position. Therefore one could clearly argue that we could see a situation in which the United States would favor a world without nuclear weapons.

My own view is that one of the key components of a world without nuclear weapons is the verification component. I guess one can concede the situation in which cheating on a Chemical Weapons Convention, for example, would not be considered strategically ruinous, but I am not sure you could reach the same conclusion on a nuclear abolition treaty. How many weapons, one, two, three, before you really had a strategically unstable situation? My own personal view is that concern about cheating that makes it difficult for me to see how we can get totally to zero. I am not saying we should not continue working toward that goal, but I do think, for me at least, that makes it very difficult to see how you are going to get there any time soon.

VICTOR VASILIEV: In my lifetime I have happened to live in two countries, and to work in two foreign ministries. One was the Soviet Union and another one is Russia. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union we maintained a policy of general and complete nuclear disarmament. In practice, while propagating this idea of nuclear disarmament, as you are aware, the Soviet Union was building up its nuclear arsenal in thousands.

Now Russia maintains a different position, which is criticized by some countries and some people. It is close to that of the United States and other western nuclear states and is known as nuclear deterrence. But under this strategy we moved to a much greater reduction from very high ceilings to a lower level. I think from the pragmatic point of view the second trend is more favorable than the first one. Sometimes it is better to do something than to say it. We live in a very complicated world, and of course I would like to be a very good friend with Ambassador Wulf and with all of you here in this hall, but when you open the front page of the NY Times you see so many other stories, unfriendly in nature I should say. That is why we have to take into consideration all factors when we approach the issue of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

Coming to your question of unequivocal commitment. I don't think that Russia or the United States or any other nuclear country rejected this approach. We still maintain, yes, we are for the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the final goal and as a part of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Ambassador Wulf in his previous presentation mentioned that we should approach the 2000 Review document as a complex document which has various factors. He also mentioned this is a balance and I agree with him. The unequivocal commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons is part of this comprehensive approach. As far as Russia is concerned we are trying to fulfill our obligations leading to this goal. While achieving this goal we are taking a step-by-step approach.

You referred to the ruling of the International Court of Justice. I don't think it is up to the Court to decide at what time and how nuclear weapons should be eliminated. It is a broader process which involves many factors. What is good and what is positive is that we are striving towards this goal.

MARIA ANGELICA ARCE DE JEANNET: I think that many of the States Parties of the NPT have shown flexibility and political will at the 2000 Review Conference because we were aware that we could not afford a failure once again. After the addition of two nuclear weapon states, India and Pakistan, it was very clear that the international regime established by the NPT was jeopardized by the nuclear tests conducted by these two Asian countries. There was an obligation to engage in very serious negotiations and to reach an agreement. It is true that the 13 steps are not the only part of the Final Document, but it is the primary goal of the Final Document. The New Agenda Group pursued in the negotiations the inclusion of this unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states. As it was mentioned, it is an explicit commitment, because we already had the same commitment contained in the wording of Article VI.

It was not easy to reach this agreement, because the 13 steps are a package. All the 13 steps are very closely interrelated. The approval of the five nuclear weapon states to the unequivocal undertaking was obtained only after they got some language in the 13 steps. For one nuclear weapon state it was extremely important to have a linkage with general and complete disarmament. That means that in the process of disarmament we should have not only nuclear disarmament but also conventional disarmament. For another nuclear weapon state it was very important to have a reference to strategic stability. We have different language. We have the principle of undiminished security for all. Another nuclear weapon state was not in a position to accept a time frame for this unequivocal undertaking. But as a representative of one of the non nuclear weapon states who participated very actively in the negotiations, I want to stress that the five nuclear weapon states showed enough flexibility to conclude this agreement, and this must be recognized by all States Parties, because we could have had the same situation that we had in 1995, in 1990 and in 1985 where we couldn't agree on a final substantive document. Last year we really got that Final Document.

Now the challenge is how to implement those commitments. We should recognize that the international situation right now is not the best to allow some of the nuclear weapon states to proceed with concrete actions. Nevertheless, the non nuclear weapon states have an obligation to continue pushing for these additional concrete steps in the field of nuclear disarmament.

JONATHAN GRANOFF: I noted that Secretary Powell referred to Senator Cranston, who was my mentor in this subject. I am his successor as the President of the Global Security Institute. I would like to express public appreciation for his clarity and years of leadership and inspiration. The key difference between his perspective and Secretary Powell's goes to the issue of interests, guarding our interests. Senator Cranston defined our interests in three capacities. One was morality. He felt very strongly that the continued threat to use nuclear weapons on hundreds of millions of innocent people as a means of obtaining security was intrinsically unworthy of civilization. That was the term that he used. He also expressed the issue of stability. He thought that the continued reliance of very strong states on nuclear weapons for their security would be a stimulant for other states to try and develop nuclear arsenals. He argued that the interest being guarded included stability, and that the elimination of nuclear weapons would increase stability.

The third was one of moral coherence, and consistency. If one state is going to say to other states, you should not have them, that state should also move to eliminate them. So those were the interests that he articulated in distinction to Secretary Powell's interests. I have not heard clearly articulated by Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China or the United States what the prevailing national interests are that justify the continued reliance on nuclear weapons. We are not ideological or practical enemies any longer. I just don't think anybody really believes that the United States has some aspiration to take over Russia or that Russia has imperial ambitions to take over and threaten the United States any longer. So what are the Russian interests presently that are so overriding that necessitate reliance on nuclear weapons? And Ambassador Wulf, what are the interests presently of the United States that are so pressing that we need to keep nuclear weapons? What are the present arguments to keep these weapons that we have to overcome?

VICTOR VASILIEV: I am not a Chinese diplomat to raise this issue but for a couple of weeks we eye-witnessed a huge crisis with regard to the spy aircraft. With all its complexities the US and China are living through this crisis. Yes, there are some in the US and in China who would like to make sharp remarks. But all those people, especially those who are in power, realize quite well that we are dealing with superpowers. Like it or not, nuclear weapons are a kind of a symbol of a superpower which helps to resolve very difficult questions in a responsible manner.

As far as Russia is concerned, of course we have our own national interests, as the United States and other countries have. To give you a few examples, if we speak about the United States and its neighbors we are speaking about Canada and Mexico, a nice warm environment, surrounded by the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. With Russia it is a bit different. When you look at the map you see a number of conflict spots along our border. We try to maintain friendly relations with all our neighbors. But we have to be realistic and we need to secure our borders.

Another problem is the question of NATO. We may confront in the very near future the expansion of NATO very close to the border of Russia. Both strategic nuclear and tactical nuclear weapons are located in Europe. Military doctrine adopted by the US military can allow some tactical nuclear weapons for aircraft to be used by German pilots, so we may confront not only direct threats but also a nuclear sharing threat as well.

Taking this into consideration, we still need to rely on nuclear arsenals. But as I said we are willing to go ahead with our nuclear reductions and to negotiate further arms reduction treaties with the United States and with our European partners.

AMBASSADOR NORMAN WULF: I am glad I come second; it is easier, in some ways. It is of course true that the relationship between the United States and Russia now is fundamentally different than the relationship that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. The areas of cooperation are extensive. The United States has spent by this point over $6 billion in Russia seeking to secure its nuclear program so that it can assure that it does not leak out the back door to proliferators. There is unheard of cooperation in areas such as safe storage of their nuclear warheads. We are building a huge complex at Mayak with US taxpayers' dollars that is devoted to ensuring that the plutonium I talked about earlier, does not revert back to weapons use during the years that it will take to have that converted into totally benign materials. The plutonium will go into this facility, once it is complete, and the IAEA will ensure that it never comes out except for conversion into MOX fuel. There are other examples I could cite.

The same is true with respect to China, a relationship that continues to evolve. When I was driving to the airport this morning, the words were very encouraging about what was going to happen to the crew of this plane, that they were going to be released. One does not have to have a long memory to recall the vast changes that have occurred in the nature of our relationship with China. It is fundamentally different from what it was even five years ago, let alone ten. I can remember the first visit I made to China was in 1984, and the Embassy took me to two spots where there were private enterprise stalls, as they were called then. Now they are everywhere. The state stores are facades. It is the private enterprise stalls that are running that system. There was one decent hotel in Beijing in 1984. Now you can find any number. These are only small indications of some of the fundamental changes that are taking place. Other changes, obviously, are the information technology that is available. I could go on at some length.

I have no disagreement with the premise of the question put to me. There has been a fundamental change. But there is a reality that our Russian colleague just underscored, and that is that there still are nuclear weapons in Russia, there are still nuclear weapons in China, and neither, I believe, is prepared to give them up, even if the Untied States is prepared to give them up. Then the question becomes, should those weapons be retained by the United States as an insurance of deterrence? That is certainly my assumption as to why the United States continues to possess nuclear weapons. I underscore, my assumption. Again, I will revert back to what I said earlier. This is part of the review that is taking place in Washington. I refer all of you to the campaign statement made by candidate Bush on May 20 of last year in which he goes through a fairly lengthy discussion on the role of nuclear weapons. But the fundamental thrust of that statement was to say that we really need to take a hard look, not whether, but how many we need, and for what purposes. And that is exactly what is going on in Washington now.

JOHN REMPEL, Mennonite Central Committee: A question for Mr. Vasiliev with regard to the comments that Ambassador Wulf made earlier regarding START III and the US use of parallel reduction as a negotiating mechanism. I am wondering how Russia views that.

VICTOR VASILIEV: It is obvious two powers posses the most nuclear warheads. It is all but natural that those two powers engage in negotiations. Russia maintains that the best way to address the issue is first through bilateral negotiations, and we hope that other nuclear powers, as Angelica said, will join those negotiations. At the same time we also understand that some of the steps in nuclear disarmament we can take unilaterally. We only ratified START II in April last year. Before that date we were taking certain steps to reduce our arsenals according to the limits of the START II agreement. After the agreements with the US to go ahead with START III, Russia is already preparing to go ahead with further reductions of our nuclear arsenal. What is also important, once again, is the environment. We have to look at the American policy vis a vis arsenals. What is worrisome is that the American Administration made it rather clear that Russia is no longer a priority for US policy. I don't know how nuclear talks will go if Russia is not a priority. With whom would the new Administration conduct negotiations? So that is why we have to take all those factors, seriously consider them, and after evaluation we can establish our policy, be it unilateral or, as I hope, a continuation of a bilateral process in this field. I do not know if I answered your question entirely.

ERYL COURT, Canada Voice of Women: There is a great deal of opposition to missile defense in Canada. Professor John Polanyi, a Nobel laureate, referred to this system as illusory. Another Nobel laureate, Professor Joseph Rotblat, has pointed out that this system, intended to achieve security, does just the opposite. We now live in a global village. No member of the global village can be safe unless all are safe. ...We are involved in a terrible gambling game...we are playing nuclear poker...the force of law must replace force...I would like to see the US leading the world for peace.

AMBASSADOR NORMAN WULF: It is not only in Canada that the question of missile defense is controversial. There is also, I think, a fair amount of controversy in the United States, and probably a fair amount of opposition. All I can say is that there has been some evolution in the thinking with respect to missile defense between the previous Administration and this Administration. That evolution is even more firm that we will proceed with missile defenses. But the one evolution that I would point to is that this Administration has adopted, as a matter of its policy, that what we are seeking to deploy is a missile defense system that is capable not only of defending the United States but also our friends and allies. That is a departure from where we were before. I don't think that addresses your concern.

Some argue that one cannot be for nuclear disarmament and also for the ABM Treaty. The basic underlying premise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972 when it was negotiated was Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The goal was to ensure that both sides remain subject to total annihilation and that the way to achieve that was to limit the amount of defenses they could put in place so that they would remain vulnerable. Many find that goal incompatible with the post-Cold War situation.

This Administration has said that the purpose of the missile defense system that it is pursuing is not to provide an impenetrable shield that will protect it against retaliation, or a first attack from Russia. Rather, it continues to point to a limited capability against a limited threat. The threat that it points to is the threat from rogue states. The question that arises is, is that an appropriate response to a rogue state threat? Why would any country attack the United States with a nuclear missile when it is clear that, of all forms of attack, that is probably the most easily traced to where it was launched. Wouldn't the United States immediately retaliate? Therefore any country that did this has a death wish. But that presently is the concern. There may be countries that have that approach. We know there are suicide bombers, unfortunately, in the Middle East. It is almost a daily occurrence. We also know that more countries are acquiring missile capabilities. I quickly add that the countries that protest the most strongly against missile defense, Russia and China, are also the countries that have supplied those missiles to rogue states. The question really comes down to, can you deal with a rogue state in the way that you dealt with others, that is to rely on nuclear deterrence?

The Clinton Administration, I believe, said, no, you can't rely on that. The Bush Administration is clearly thinking you cannot rely on that. I think they are also saying you can't use the same concepts to protect against an accidental launch. Right now there is absolutely no defense if a missile were accidentally launched against the United States. And this at least would provide a capability against that kind of attack.

To address mistakes the US and Russia last year reached agreement on two separate approaches to that question. First, that when we launch we would notify each other, in advance, so that there would be no misunderstanding as to what was happening. Secondly, that we would share with each other, and establish in Moscow, an early warning system, so that we would be talking with each other and detecting a launch anywhere in the world. The system is not yet in place, but the agreement is, and they are going forward with the mechanisms to put them in place.

I am not sure that I have a comfortable answer to your question. What I do know is that these are some of the arguments. Any Administration must deal with the fact that President Clinton signed a piece of legislation that commits the United States to deploy missile defenses as soon as it is practically feasible. If the Nobel prize winners that you cite are correct, that it is never going to be feasible, then we are talking about a problem that is theoretical only. On the other hand, if there is a practical system out there - I don't think it has been established that there is - then I suspect we will see that system going forward.

VICTOR VASILIEV: I agree with some of the arguments expressed by Ambassador Wulf. I think there are two basic problems with NMD (National Missile Defense). The first one is whether it is an defensive or offensive program. In my opinion it is offensive in nature because, as I said, the ABM Treaty paved the way for the reduction of nuclear weapons because there was no need to have more if there was no good defense. With possible NMD deployment there is an incentive, not only for Russia, to build up their nuclear arsenal.

Another problem is more important to my mind. The deployment of National Missile Defense provides that some of the components of the system will be in outer space, which means that we are opening a new sphere for the arms race in outer space, in violation of the present agreements and understandings not to use outer space as a field of military confrontation. That is why Russia is strongly opposing this idea. For the second year we introduced in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly which deals with disarmament, with China and Belarus, a resolution to preserve the ABM Treaty. We have an increasing number of countries who are supporting our initiative.

MARIA ANGELICA ARCE DE JEANNET: The preservation of the ABM Treaty is a matter of great concern and importance for many of the states members of the United Nations. We recognize that it has to be dealt with by the two states, the United States and the Russian Federation, but any alteration or modification could have implications for global security. Many member states supported the resolution offered by the Russian Federation, Belarus and China. It is true this resolution also had a good number of abstentions and votes against but it has been adopted by a large majority. We also adopted a resolution presented by Iran that calls for a group of experts on missiles to start consideration in a multilateral body the issue of missiles in all its aspects. We hope that this group will present recommendations to the General Assembly next year on ways and means to address this issue.

DIANE PERLMAN, Psychologists for Social Responsibility: Ambassador Wulf, maybe you got to pick a pocket or two...Many billions of dollars involved. Eisenhower warned us about the military industrial complex. People on the Rumsfeld Commission have a vested interest in the threat from rogue states...Weapons are a symptom of a deeper problem. We are talking about taking something away without replacing it. We must replace war with another method of resolving conflicts...

AMBASSADOR NORMAN WULF: ... With regard to the military industrial complex, who am I to argue with President Eisenhower? And what was true in 1960 is probably even more true today. Should we put more money into studying peace? The answer for me is obvious, absolutely yes. It is not my decision to make.

ANN HALLAN LAKHDHIR, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies: Yesterday in the Disarmament Commission the Russian delegate said "Russia regards as possible the creation, as appropriate, of non-strategic, region-wide ABM systems to neutralize and counter missile threats. Such systems would be created on a multilateral, non-block basis with the involvement of all the states concerned. We are also prepared for cooperation in this field with all the interested countries."

If ballistic missile defense were associated with either the total elimination of all nuclear missiles, or getting down to a very low number, and if it were a multilateral system, I think many of us would feel very differently about it. I have wondered if there has been any discussion, and I think you can go back to President Reagan, who at one point was talking about sharing with the Soviet Union, once he had achieved such a system. Has there been any discussion of multilateral sharing of the sort proposed yesterday in the Disarmament Commission?

Another question: I have hoped for many years that there would be created in the Conference on Disarmament a subcommittee that began studying the verification that would be required to eliminate nuclear weapons. It clearly is essential for any treaty that abolishes nuclear weapons. It certainly would not be approved by any of the present countries that have nuclear weapons if they didn't have a fair amount of confidence that you could verify, maybe not 100%, but at least sufficiently so that everyone would feel more secure than they do right now. I had noted at the NPT Review Conference that the UK had an initiative in this area. I am wondering, whether in Russia, and in the US, there are efforts being made to determine not only on what would be required to verify a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, but beyond that, the kind of verification that would be required in order to have a treaty abolishing nuclear weapons. Would this be seen as helpful by non-nuclear countries, and not just as a delaying tactic?

AMBASSADOR NORMAN WULF: In the statement made by Russia yesterday I think I heard the word non-strategic. Fundamentally, the past definition of strategic has been anything that could be launched from the continental US and hit Russia, and vice versa. Non-strategic was everything else. If that is what Russia is proposing, it probably does not answer the threat the Administration says it is concerned with, which is a threat from countries such as North Korea who could launch, from their territory, a missile that could reach US territory. So I am not sure that it is responsive to the concern that has been articulated.

On sharing with Russia, you are correct, my recollection is the same, that the Reagan Administration, when it was pursuing Star Wars, talked about the prospect of sharing with the Soviet Union. I have heard no such discussion from either the Clinton Administration or the Bush Administration. Finally, on the question of verification, I know of no ongoing studies in the United States government to look at the verification of the total elimination of nuclear weapons with any degree of seriousness. On setting up a negotiating group within the CD, I defer to Angelica.

MARIA ANGELICA ARCE DE JEANNET: Last year at the NPT Conference we agreed on the issue of verification. Verification is the 13th step. We agreed on the further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-free world. Once a situation will be presented, all States Parties should consider the format to follow-up with these verification aspects. It is the view of some states parties that first of all we should negotiate and conclude a convention for the abolition of nuclear weapons. An annex to be included in that convention could be perhaps the establishment of an international agency to verify these aspects. But at this stage it is premature. Some governments have started thinking on what could be done. First of all we have to make progress with the further reduction of nuclear weapons.

VICTOR VASILIEV: Thank you for paying attention to Russia's initiative to counter missile threats. Russia is ready to cooperate in non-strategic missile defense. The idea of a non-strategic missile defense is first of all to address the concerns that may arise. Ambassador Wulf said that the very acceptance of the idea that such concerns do exist justifies the need to have a NMD. I would like to say that one requisite in discussing the idea is to have an evaluation of possible threats. Do we really face a real threat from countries like Iran and North Korea? Are these threats enough to put at risk the whole system of strategic stability? One answer is no. We can discuss the possibility of creating theater missile defense, or European missile defense, or other defenses. What is important about these proposals is that they not be in violation of the existing arms control agreements. The ideas of those who propose National Missile Defense are in total contradiction of present agreements in arms control.

Non-strategic missile defense proposals are part of a bigger strategy presented by the Russian Federation that also includes a global control system on the non proliferation of missiles and missile technology. In March this year a big conference took place in Moscow which discussed various aspects of this issue. As you all know, we have a Missile Technology Control Regime which is limited to only some countries. At the same time the so-called rogue countries, so-called by some countries, or those who are very vulnerable, are not members of this regime. The Russian idea is to have a system that could satisfy the existing members of the Missile Technology Control regime and attract newcomers, like Iran, North Korea, India and others, to make it a broader regime. This system could be created under the auspices of the United Nations, or independently with a broader context. The meeting in Moscow has resulted in a huge document, more than 100 pages, some of them technical, some political, on how this idea can be implemented. As we speak now, the Russian Federation is hosting another conference in Moscow on the non-militarization of outer space. I believe this conference will give a new impetus to the realization of initiatives aimed at countering missile threats.

JONATHAN GRANOFF: Mikhail Gorbachev's comments on the lessons from Reykjavik were unbelievably prescient. He talked about the opportunity, the unique chance, to really end the arms race and eliminate nuclear weapons And he talked about how progress was being made but how the entire momentum was totally destroyed by the aspiration, as he saw it, to weaponize space. The US Space Command's Vision 20/20 talks about "full spectrum dominance". It is my hope, as an American citizen, that the people who want to use space for peaceful purposes will persuade the military industrial complex to stop any quest for full spectrum dominance so we can live in a world in which nuclear weapons are eliminated. Thank you for coming, and please keep up the work to create that world in which we are not threatening each other. Thank you.

Transcript made possible by the NGO Committee on Disarmament.