8. IAEA and Safeguards: Combating Terrorism

8.1 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) described its plan of
action to improve protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear material and other radioactive materials. The eight areas are:

"1) physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; 2) detection of malicious activities (such as illicit trafficking) involving nuclear and other radioactive materials; 3) strengthening of State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control; 4) security of radioactive sources, 5) the assessment of safety and security related vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities; 6) response to malicious acts or threats thereof; 7) the adherence to international agreements and guidelines, and 8) enhancement of programme co-ordination and information management for nuclear security related matters."

8.2 These measures, costing $12 million annually, will be funded through voluntary
means. The Agency currently safeguards more than 900 facilities in 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of $80 million per year. "It is clear that if the Agency is to continue to provide credible verification assurances, and strengthen its safeguards system, the verification mission must be matched by the required resources."

8.3 The IAEA reported on two contentious areas:

"Democratic People 's Republic Korea

The Agency continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of nuclear material subject to safeguards in accordance with its NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency. At the request of the UN Security Council, however, the Agency since November 1994 has been monitoring the "freeze" of DPRK's graphite moderated reactor and related facilities in accordance with the "Agreed Framework" between the United States and the DPRK, and has also maintained a continuous inspector presence at the Nyongbyong site. Although DPRK's safeguards agreement with the Agency remains binding and in force, the DPRK continues to link this verification to progress in the implementation of the light-water reactor project as provided for in the US-DPRK "Agreed Framework". As the Agency has mentioned earlier, the work required to verify that all nuclear materials subject to safeguards in the DPRK have been declared and placed under safeguards could take 3-4 years, with full co-operation on the part of the DPRK.

Iraq

The Director General has reiterated that the Agency continues to stand ready to resume its Security Council mandated verification activities in Iraq at short notice. The IAEA's objective should it return to Iraq, is clear: but to provide assurances through verification measures that the situation with regard to nuclear activities in Iraq has not changed since the Agency verification ceased in December 1998, and, provided that the status quo ante could be re-established, it could be possible to move to the implementation of the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification plan."

8.4 The IAEA made the point that 51 states have still not concluded required comprehensive safeguards agreements, and the strengthened safeguards system (known as Additional Protocols) still lacks full support; 24 states are still to sign on.

9. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Blocked

9.1 The Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO) reported that the CTBT has been signed by 165 states, of whom 90 have ratified it. But 13 of the 44 states required to ratify it (because they have nuclear reactors) have not done so. Only the U.S., of the five NWS, has not done so. Since the U.S. has withdrawn its support of the CTBT, entry-into-force is presently blocked.

9.2 Of the 321 stations in the International Monitoring Systems, site surveys have
been completed for 270; 122 stations have been incorporated into the verification system and 104 are under construction.

9.3 The Commission is holding a series of workshops around the world to deepen understanding of the Treaty significance and to explore possible benefits of the application of verification technologies for scientific and civil purposes.

10. 'No Moral Acceptance'

10.1 The Holy See, a State Party to the NPT, said it was "alarming" that prospects for implementation of the 13 Steps are so discouraging. "Even more serious than the lack of progress is the overt determination of some nuclear weapon states to maintain nuclear weapons in a critical role in their military doctrines."

10.2 In a speech delivered by Msgr. Francis Chullikatt, Deputy Head of the
Delegation, the Holy See said that new strategies contemplating the use of nuclear weapons "must be stoutly resisted." It warned that the rule of law "cannot countenance the continuation of doctrines that hold nuclear weapons as essential."

"There can be no moral acceptance of military doctrines that embody the permanence of nuclear weapons. That is why Pope John Paul II has called for the banishment of all nuclear weapons through "a workable system for negotiation, even of arbitration." Those nuclear weapon states resisting negotiations should therefore be strongly urged to finally come to the negotiating table.

In fact, in clinging to their outmoded rationales for nuclear deterrence, they are denying the most ardent aspirations of humanity as well as the opinion of the highest legal authority in the world. In this regard, my Delegation wishes to reaffirm its well-known position: nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century; they cannot be justified. These weapons are instruments of death and destruction. The preservation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty demands unequivocal action towards their elimination. Only when such a noble goal is attained can the international community be assured that nations are acting in "good faith"..

To keep developing weapon systems that can jeopardize the natural structure upon which all civilization rests seriously undermines the genuine quest of the family of nations to build a culture of peace for the present and future generations."

11. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Germany's Approach

11.1 In 2000, the 13 Practical Steps included a passage on tactical nuclear weapons. Under the category of steps based on the principle of undiminished security for all was put:

"The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process."

In addition to Russia' supply, tactical nuclear weapons are store in six non-nuclear weapons states in Europe.

11.2 While no action in implementing this step is apparent, Germany (breaking out of E.U. solidarity) submitted a Working paper. It said, in part:

"There are significantly more nuclear warheads for tactical delivery systems than for strategic ones. The exact numbers are unknown; during the Cold War tens of thousands of warheads and nuclear mines were produced; and we have to assume that there are still thousands of them left today. The sheer numbers in some arsenals give rise to concerns. Non-strategic nuclear weapons are seen to pose particular risks also for other reasons: many of the warheads are presumably old and might have already exceeded their original lifespan; there are perceptions that the barriers against their use are lower compared with strategic systems; storage and deployment patterns and possible additional transportation risks as well as the often smaller size foster concerns about enhanced proliferation risks and the danger that terrorists might gain access to them..

Recognizing that their elimination will not be possible in one leap, a gradual approach is suggested, which could include the following elements:

a) Reporting by Russia and the United States on the implementation of the 1991/92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives;

b) Formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives including an agreement on appropriate verification measures which would give assurance of compliance with them;

c) In line with the December 2000 NATO Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures, Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament: agreement on reciprocal exchanges of information regarding readiness status, safety provisions and safety features, and an exchange of data on US and Russian sub-strategic nuclear forces. The adoption of the four CSBMs, which are the subject of discussions in the context of the Nato-Russia relationship, should be encouraged;

d) Following a successful conclusion of the current bilateral negotiations on strategic offensive arms Russia and the United States should be encouraged to start negotiations on non-strategic nuclear weapons in order to close the existing loophole in the nuclear disarmament process;

e) The NPT Review Conference and its Preparatory Commission should be regularly informed about the progress made on the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

f) In line with the requirement of reducing nuclear dangers nuclear-weapon States, which have not yet done so, should also take particular security precautions (i.e. physical protection measures for transport and storage) regarding their non-strategic nuclear arsenals. The NPT Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee should be kept duly informed about this."

11.3 Germany backed up the above paper with another Working Paper, "Attaining a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World." It specified the following matters of "key importance. at this juncture":

a) efforts to ensure the full compliance with and universal adherence to the NPT;
b) the early entry into force and implementation of the CTBT;
c) the start and early conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT;
d) the achievement of a binding agreement between the US and Russia on the verifiable and irreversible reduction of their strategic offensive arms;
e) the start of negotiations on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

11.4 Delegates had available a Report, "Time to Control Tactical Nuclear Weapons," produced by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). It pointed out that while the current situation does not seem to lend itself to the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on tactical nuclear weapons, transparency and confidence-building measures could be taken. It called for the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in the planned reductions of the 1997 Helsinki Agreement.

11.5 In her contribution to the seminar which produced the report, Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director of the Acronym Institute, summed up three central points that run through this discussion:

"1. There is an increasingly blurred distinction between tactical, sub-strategic, non-strategic and strategic nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, demarcations were made in terms of yield or range, but that will not work now, and we have to consider the questions of definition and function again.

2. While advocating the implementation of the 1991-92 declarations, we
need to be clear that as long as new nuclear weapons - especially TNWs - are still being researched, developed or even just discussed as possible future developments, particularly by the United States, addressing the security and elimination of Russia's existing TNWs will be very much harder.

3. The fate of the CTBT and the NPT have, from their inception, been inextricably intertwined. Playing fast and loose with the CTBT, as the United States is now doing, could lead to the collapse of that treaty and a resumption of nuclear testing. That in turn could lead to a further erosion of confidence in the NPT, with negative consequences for United States and international security."

12. Reporting Requirements: Canada's Effort

12.1 Step 12 of the 13 Practical Steps states:

"Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996."

12.2 Also, the 2000 Final Document requested reports from countries "on the steps they have taken to promote the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East."

12.2 While this reporting was agreed to in 2000, the scope, frequency and format of reporting was not specified. Thus states brought different views to the PrepComm.

12.3 The New Agenda countries wanted specific, detailed reports on the
implementation of Article VI (see 3.4 above). The Western NWS, led by the U.S., held out for only the most general "submissions."

12.4 Among the few states that submitted reports, Canada, Ireland, Sweden, Poland, Indonesia, New Zealand and Germany all used different formats. Most put Article VI (the reason for the reporting requirement in the first place) within other elements of the Treaty.

12.5 Canada took a leading role in trying to advance some standardization. First, it
submitted a Working paper, suggesting reports on the implementation of the whole Treaty be submitted by each country to each PrepComm. Canada followed this up by submitting a report on the Treaty, article by article. Under Article VI, Canada stated, that, in addition to codifying U.S.-Russian reductions in strategic weapons, tactical nuclear weapons should now be focused on as well. "Canada, as a member of NATO, continues to advocate that the Alliance play a positive role in advancing disarmament objectives, through a continuous step-by-step approach."

12.6 In an attempt to broker a compromise formula, Canada offered to hold, before the 2003 PrepComm, informal open-ended consultations in Geneva. Several Western States supported this proposal, although Switzerland noted that, so weak is the NPT implementation system, there are no funds and no services available for the holding of such important consultations. South Africa commented that the kind of consultations Canada was proposing went outside the NPT review process, another example of a process that is far from strengthened. The U.K. and France expressed skepticism about the exercise, and the U.S. said that any attempt by states "to dictate the format and timing of reports is doomed to failure."

12.7 A 113-page NGO document, "NGO Shadow Report on Nuclear Disarmament:
Accountability is Democracy, Transparency is Security," prepared by Reaching Critical Will, provides technical detail and compliance analyses of 37 countries. It provides far more details concerning weapons, policies and implementation than any government report. But delegations for the most part ignored this kind of detailed reporting.

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