WASHINGTON: Much media attention has been focused on cabinet selections and partisan politics. But it has become clear that any legislative success in the 107th Congress will require a coalition of centrists from both sides of the aisle.

Nowhere is bipartisan cooperation more important than in the realm of national security. The new Congress must identify issues on which bipartisan agreement is possible. The spread of weapons of mass destruction is one such issue. Seeking a bipartisan approach to nuclear nonproliferation should be among the principal goals of the next administration and Congress.

Historically, nonproliferation measures have enjoyed strong support from both sides of the aisle; we need to reinvigorate that support. A good way to start would be to consider the recommendations in the report issued by Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, special adviser to the president and the secretary of state for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. General Shalikashvili concludes that, with proper programs in place, the treaty will improve United States security and will not, as some have suggested, jeopardize nuclear deterrence.

In the debate preceding its October 1999 vote on the test ban treaty, the Senate was presented with compelling but conflicting statements on the nonproliferation benefits of the treaty and questions regarding its impact on the long-term safety and reliability - and hence deterrence value - of our nuclear arsenal. But the truncated debate meant there were no adequate answers given on these issues.

As a result, shortly before the vote, 62 senators signed a letter to Senators Trent Lott and Tom Daschle urging that final consideration of the treaty be put off until the next Congress. A clear, bipartisan majority, with a wide range of individual views on ratification, deemed this issue sufficiently important to delay a vote until cooler heads - and more thorough consideration - could prevail. This treaty is too important for the vote of the last Congress to be the final word.

Now General Shalikashvili proposes in his report to the president 16 recommendations and reservations that we believe deserve careful consideration by the Bush administration. For example, he urges increased support for nonproliferation- related intelligence resources and improved global test monitoring capabilities. He also proposes a number of steps to improve our nation's ability to maintain our nuclear arsenal without nuclear tests and advocates a renewed commitment to a comprehensive, bipartisan nonproliferation agenda.

Most importantly, General Shalikashvili recommends that the new administration propose periodic joint reviews - conducted with the Senate - of the treaty's impact on national security after the pact is put in place.

In our view, a periodic review of the treaty is the best way to address the Senate's concerns about whether the safety and reliability of the nuclear arsenal could be assured with absolute certainty beyond 10 years. Such a review could begin nine years after ratification, and could be repeated at regular intervals. The periodic review should allay fears that the treaty may in the long term do harm to American security and that of our allies. If a review cannot give satisfactory assurances that the nuclear arsenal remained safe and reliable, the treaty would be set aside until such assurances can be provided.

The fact is that the suspension of nuclear tests instituted by President George Bush and Congress in 1992 will remain in place for many years to come. There are advantages to the United States in our international relations in ratifying the test ban treaty. The treaty is an important element of the global nonproliferation regime and crucial to American leadership of those efforts. The review proposal, coupled with other steps recommended by General Shalikashvili provides appropriate insurance that America can preserve the advantage of our nuclear arsenal while limiting further development of offensive nuclear weaponry.

Advancing nuclear nonproliferation is a bipartisan goal worth pursuing. Success in ratifying the test ban treaty would be a first step toward bipartisan cooperation on other crucial matters of national security.

Harold Brown was defense secretary from 1977 to 1981; Melvin R. Laird, who was a congressman for nine terms, was defense secretary from 1969 to 1973; William J. Perry was defense secretary from 1994 to 1997.